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I. INTRODUCTION
In a decision that shocked many observers, the Court of Justice for the
European Union (CJEU) rejected the EU’s draft agreement to accede to the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the basis that it
threatened the autonomy of the EU legal order.1 The decision identified the
legal order with its highest court and insisted on that court’s (its own)
primacy as interpreter.2 This type of approach did not appear in Luxembourg
out of the blue. Rather it reflects thinking that has been prevalent in the law
reform decisions of several EU member states that also saw their autonomy
as under threat from the ECHR. Parliaments, particularly in the old
democratic systems that value parliamentary supremacy, have sought to
empower their own national judges to counter the threat to sovereignty they
see from the ECHR.
In Western Europe, judicial review means review by international courts.
Acceding to the ECHR and allowing individual petition to the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg brought significant changes
to both substantive rights and legal institutions throughout Europe. One of
the most fundamental is the adoption of ex post judicial review.3 While a
number of countries adopted constitutional review in the wake of their
experiences with authoritarian governments, the older parliamentary
democracies saw no need to change their constitutional structures to include
it. That pattern has begun to change. France and the United Kingdom have
both had long internal debates with respect to whether judges should be
permitted to engage in constitutional review of legislation; both now allow
it.4 Likewise, Belgium adopted a scheme very similar to the French one5 and

1 Opinion 2/13, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU – Accession of the European
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paras. 184–200 (Dec. 18, 2014), available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62013CV0002&from=EN.
2 Id. paras. 245–48.
3 “Ex post” judicial review means review of a law after it has been implemented. In
contrast, “a priori” judicial review refers to review of a law before it has been implemented.
4 Loi 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009, relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de la
constitution [Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009 relative to the Application of Article 61-1
of the Constitution], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 2009, p. 21379; Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.);
Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.).
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the idea seems to be spreading northward; having been introduced in the
Netherlands and several Scandinavian countries.6 These reforms are a
measure of both the unease and the embeddedness of parliaments in a
European rights system.
With some exceptions,7 scholars have discussed these reforms as they
have occurred in a specific national context.8 However, they ought to be
seen together as part of a widely adopted strategy of managing Europe’s
transnational counter-majoritarian difficulty. Members of parliament in
several jurisdictions predicted that more judicial review at home would mean
less review abroad. The new judicial review will certainly not defend against
the encroaching European judicial review, but it does create a space for
national jurisdictions within the European order. Thus, despite the strikingly
nationalist rhetoric, the reforms represent a conciliatory stance towards
integration. They set, not boundary lines, but the terms of a dialogue. And
they only serve to reduce resort to Strasbourg if national courts decide the

5 Loi spéciale modifiant l’article 26 de la loi spéciale du janvier 1989 sur la Cour
d’arbitrage [Special Law Modifying Article 26 of the Special Law of January 1989] of July
12, 2009, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], July 31, 2009, 51617.
6
Ran Hirschl, The Nordic Counternarrative, Democracy, Human Rights, and Judicial
Review, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449, 450–52 (2011); Monica Claes & Gerhard van der Schyff,
Towards Judicial Constitutional Review in the Netherlands?, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
NETHERLANDS AND SOUTH AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 123, 132 (Gerhard van der Schyff
ed., 2008); Torbjörn Bergman, Sweden: Democratic Reforms and Partisan Decline in an
Emerging Separation-of-Powers System, 27 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 203, 218 (2004).
7 Marco Tabarelli, The Influence of the EU and the ECHR on ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty
Regimes’: Assessing the Impact of European Integration on the British and Swedish
Judiciaries, 19 EUR. L.J. 340 (2013) (comparing the influence of EU and European law on the
British and Swedish judiciaries).
8 See Anthony La Sueur, The Conception of the UK’s New Supreme Court, in BUILDING
THE UK’S NEW SUPREME COURT: NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 3, 7–8
(Anthony La Sueur ed., 2007). In France, scholarly discussion has contrasted the country’s
weak contrôle de constitutionnalité (constitutional review) with its robust contrôle de
conventionnalité (convention review). See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Anti-Ashwander:
Constitutional Litigation as First Resort in France, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 15 (2010);
Jean-François Flauss, L’influence du droit européen sur l’instauration d’un contrôle de
constitutionnalité des lois par la voie préjudicielle, in GUILLAUME DRAGO, L’APPLICATION DE
LA CONSTITUTION PAR LES COURS SUPREMES ; CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, CONSEIL D’ETAT,
COUR DE CASSATION 165 (2007); Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, Contrôle de constitutionnalité
et contrôle de conventionnalité, in MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE DANIEL LABETOULLE (2007);
Denys de Béchillon & Nicholas Molfessis, Sur les rapports entre le Conseil constitutionnel et
les diverses branches du droit: propos introductifs, 16 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL
CONSTITUTIONNEL 160 (2004).
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same way Strasbourg would, further integrating European Rights norms into
national jurisprudence.
Many have discussed why a liberal democracy might choose judicial
review when a constitution is being drafted or why it might seek to empower
courts at a later date. Legislators might want to empower courts as
insurance, taking constitutional issues out of normal politics.9 They might
believe that courts will be more faithful rights protectors than legislatures.10
A party might think itself capable of protecting rights but fear that it will lose
the next election,11 or rights issues might be so controversial that legislators
would rather have judges make the decisions.12 In countries such as
Germany, Italy, and Spain, judicial review was a way to insure against the
danger of future authoritarian regimes as well as a way to rid current law of
anti-democratic vestiges.13 In France, the moderate Gaullists’ fear that they
would lose control of Parliament played a significant role in the country’s
previous reform of the Constitutional Council.14
The recent rise of judicial review in Western Europe seems to be driven
not by these internal factors, but by the need to respond to external
developments. Transnational review displaces the control that national
parliaments once had over a core part of their constitutions: the relationship
between the state and its citizens. The values that some identify with a
certain idea of Europe, others identify with their own specific national legal
orders. They fear that Europeanization, particularly through the powerful
and unelected CJEU and the Council of Europe’s ECtHR, will erode their
democracies. This is not a universalist Europe in which national rights are
increasingly superfluous compared to deepening Europe-wide

9 See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 22–26 (2003).
10 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1971, 1986 (2004).
11 See, e.g., ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE 238 (1992)
(describing the political use of abstract review in France and Germany).
12 See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 71, 106–08 (2004) (describing judicial review on national and
European levels as elite self-preservation against populist democracy).
13 John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe,
82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1674–75 (2004).
14 See STONE, supra note 11, at 70–71.
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commitments,15 but a Europe in which tension between the two shapes
institutions at both the national and transnational levels. This is what Neil
Walker has termed “endemic boundary clash,” in which multiple and
potentially competing sovereignties exist within as well as outside the state.16
The growing importance of the Strasbourg court and the use of the ECHR
by national judges have been accompanied by renewed calls for national bills
of rights and by expanded domestic rights protection mandates for national
courts. Reactions have been particularly vehement in countries with a strong
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. The United Kingdom, Belgium, and
France have all changed their laws to create new avenues of national-level
rights review. Although they offered various and conflicting rationales for
the changes, many politicians relied on the argument that the national
constitution should be the primary instrument for preserving citizens’ rights.
After assessing their own institutional capacity and that of domestic and
transnational courts, sovereign parliaments gave domestic judges new
authority to interpret the constitution. This choice has not returned them to a
more closed legal order. Rather, it sets up new opportunities for conflict as
the relationship of the ECHR to constitutional law is still uncertain, and all
states remain subject to ultimate ECtHR review.
Part II of this Article gives a brief overview of the European legal context
and the ECtHR as an institution. Part III describes the choice for judicial
review in the United Kingdom and France, where years of parliamentary
debates show the evolution of the idea of national courts as a response to
Europe as the parliaments in question became more alarmed about the
ECtHR’s review powers. Finally, Part IV discusses the results of reform,
demonstrating its limited scope and its link to ongoing reform efforts at the
transnational level.
II. THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT
Unlike constitutional reforms in some democracies, the Western
European reforms did not involve a choice for or against judicial review.
They were already subject to review by transnational courts under two
distinct bodies of region-wide laws: EU law, the law of the European Union;
15 But see Rubenfeld, supra note 10, at 1993–94; Jochen A. Frowein, The Transformation
of Constitutional Law Through the European Convention on Human Rights, 41 ISR. L. REV.
489, 493 (2008).
16 Neil Walker, Late Sovereignty in the European Union, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 3,
27 (Neil Walker ed., 2006).
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and European law, the law of the Council of Europe. In some instances,
national courts could apply these laws as well.
Although, my discussion will focus on European law and the European
Court of Human Rights because that court and its jurisprudence were of
particular concern in parliamentary debate, EU law has an increasingly
significant role in rights review in Europe. The CJEU has often approached
issues through a rights-based framework,17 and the Charter of Fundamental
Rights only increases its mandate to do so.18 Additionally, the EU’s Treaty
of Lisbon requires ECHR accession and that ECHR rights be treated as
general principles of EU law;19 although the process is stalled as the result of
the CJEU’s decision.20
A. Subsidiarity and Margin of Appreciation
Two concepts are essential to discussion of both European and EU law.
The first is subsidiarity, the principle that matters should be decided by the
member states or their local authorities whenever possible with transnational
authority acting as a subsidiary to that of the states.21 A transnational court
acting according to this principle will not overturn a decision in a matter that
national courts have handled adequately.22 The second concept, the margin
of appreciation, defines how subsidiarity is to be applied.23 According to this
principle, a national government should be afforded a margin of appreciation
in how it interprets and applies ECHR rights.24 This may occur in a number
of acceptable ways.25 Within the margin of appreciation, the judgment of
ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 89–91 (2004).
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C
364/1), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.
19 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, art. 6(2)–(3), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT.
20 Opinion 2/13, supra note 1, para. 179.
21 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(3), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 13, 18.
22 Id.
23 See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 57–58
(2010) (offering a selection of descriptions of the margin of appreciation).
24 Id.
25 See generally AIDEN O’NEILL, EC LAW FOR UK LAWYERS 20–21 (2011) (explaining that
courts can consider Community recommendations or take national measures when
implementing Community law).
17
18
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how to balance the individual right and the public interest belongs to national
authorities.26 The principles suggest two rationales for avoiding ECtHR
jurisdiction: domestic courts may have given the same answer as the ECtHR
would, or they may have given a different answer that is nonetheless
permissible under the ECHR.
B. The European Court of Human Rights
First created by the ECHR in 1953, the ECtHR has been reorganized
several times as its mandate has grown. Currently, judges are appointed by
states parties to the ECHR and assigned on a rotating basis to five sections,
which are balanced for gender and geography.27 The court hears two types
of applications related to ECHR violations: inter-state and individual. The
first are exceedingly rare; the second, exceedingly common. 28 By 1990, all
states parties allowed individual petition.29 Since the Convention requires
state action, the state is the defendant in every ECHR claim. If it finds a
violation, the court may award monetary compensation under Article 41 and
propose reforms to the government under Article 46.30 The Committee of
Ministers supervises enforcement,31 but shows little alacrity in doing so.32
The court’s original process was bureaucratic and less adversarial,
limiting litigation by creating alternatives to it. Under the original procedure,
the Council of Europe’s Commission reviewed all individual petitions.33 If
the petition was admissible, the Commission endeavored to bring about a
friendly settlement between state and petitioner.34 If no settlement could be
met, it transmitted a report regarding the facts and merits of the case to a
political body, the Committee of Ministers.35 This transmittal started a three-

ROGER MASTERMAN, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION:
JUDICIAL COMPETENCE AND INDEPENDENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 70 (2011).
27 REGISTRY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 15–16,
21 (2012), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2011_ENG.pdf.
28 Id. at 11.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 18.
31
Id. at 19.
32 Cf. Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights,
in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1998–2006: HISTORY, ACHIEVEMENTS, REFORM
113, 120–22 (2006) (noting problems in enforcement).
33 ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 27, at 12.
34 Id.
35 Id.
26
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month clock for the court to hear the case.36 This procedure changed in
1994, allowing an applicant to submit his case directly to a three-judge
screening panel.37
With individual petitions, the court’s caseload swelled to a point that it
threatened the ECtHR’s effectiveness.38 The Council of Europe responded
by allowing single judges to make decisions on applications and by
consolidating thousands of cases.39 The court has finally begun to reduce the
backlog.40 In 2012, its number of pending cases fell for the first time since
1998.41 As of January 2015, 69,900 applications were pending before the
court, down from 99,900 the year before.42 This downward trend continued
in 2015, with 64,850 pending allocated applications in January 2016.43
The court’s caseload suggests a number of possible problems, among
them, a lack of understanding of the court’s role and a lack of national
judicial capacity. The number of inadmissible petitions suggests that
Europeans know that they have rights, but do not necessarily know what
these rights are or how to secure them. The second issue, lack of national
judicial capacity, is tangential to the ones explored in this Article. The
countries of the East that regularly top the court’s list of most rights
violations, such as Ukraine and Russia, face struggles over resources,
democratization, and rule of law different in character and magnitude from
those animating legal debate in countries such as Germany or the United
Kingdom.44
Id.
Id.
38 Helen Keller, Andreas Fischer & Daniela Kühne, Debating the Future of the European
Court of Human Rights After the Interlaken Conference: Two Innovative Proposals, 21 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1025, 1025–26 (2010).
39 This system started in 2010. Id. at 1030–31. In 2011, 46,930 cases were disposed of by
a single judge. In 2012, the number jumped to 81,764. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2012, at 4 (2013), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Doc
uments/Stats_analysis_2012_ENG.pdf; ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 27, at 14–15.
40 Owen Bowcott, Backlog at European Court of Human Rights Falls Below 100,000
Cases, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jan/30/Europe
an-court-human-rights-case-backlog-falls.
41 ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2012, supra note 39, at 4.
42 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2014, at 4 (2015), http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2014_ENG.pdf.
43 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2015, at 4 92016), http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2015_ENG.pdf.
44 Robert Harmsen, The Transformation of the ECHR Legal Order and the PostEnlargement Challenges facing the European Court of Human Rights, in THE NATIONAL
36
37
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The ECtHR backlog affects my argument in several ways. First and most
pragmatically, the reforms that I discuss are so recent that their effects may
only now be becoming visible in ECtHR case law. The court’s high caseload
also suggests that complaints that it has taken control of national rights
debates identify the wrong villain. By the time a case is heard in Strasbourg,
national communities have had time to debate its merits. The more likely
culprit, if one exists, is a national judge wielding the ECHR. That judge can
introduce Strasbourg jurisprudence to reshape rights at a much earlier stage.
Finally, attempts to respond to the high caseload offer a pro-Strasbourg
rationale for reform that potentially reduces access to Strasbourg or seeks to
offer a substitute. A litigant investing more time and resources in pursuing
her case under the national constitution will take longer to get to Strasbourg,
and will more likely win or abandon her case along the way. To the extent
that Strasbourg judges feel that their interests will be advanced by issuing
fewer, more considered rulings, they may welcome the growth of national,
constitutional review.
III. NEW JUDICIAL REVIEW IN OLD DEMOCRACIES
Shortly after he was elected President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy gave a
speech at Épinal, where Charles de Gaulle had denounced the ill-fated,
Fourth Republic Constitution and proposed a Fifth Republic. President
Sarkozy called for significant reforms to the current, Fifth Republic
Constitution, including to the Constitutional Council: “There is a paradox in
the fact that French citizens can contest French laws in front of European
courts but cannot contest French laws in front of French tribunals.” Yet he
did not include constitutional review in his reform agenda, considering it too
“profound” a change.45
Despite the President’s misgivings, his government later put forward a
constitutional amendment giving the Constitutional Council the power to
overrule the legislature by reviewing existing laws in response to
“constitutional questions” raised by litigants.46 When the Amendment went
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE ECHR AND EU LAWS: A COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 27, 29–31 (Giuseppe Martinico & Oreste Pollicino eds., 2010).
45 Nicolas Sarkozy, President of Fr., Address at Épinal (July 12, 2007), http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/077002273.html. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from French are
the author’s.
46 Loi 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009 relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de la
Constitution [Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009 relative to the application of article 61-1
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into effect in 2010, it marked the first time in history that France had allowed
concrete judicial review of constitutional claims.
France was following the lead of its neighbors. Among the experts called
to discuss the reform in Parliament was Belgian Senator Francis Delpérée,
who told the French deputies in the National Assembly that his own
country’s concerns “are not very far from the preoccupations expressed in
[their] bill.”47 Belgium, once similarly hostile to constitutional review, has
changed the name of its Cour d’Arbitrage to Constitutional Court and has
given it constitutional review powers with priority over transnational law.48
A less obvious comparison surfaced during the Senate floor debates—the
United Kingdom, too, has a strong tradition of parliamentary supremacy. 49
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom had introduced constitutional review in
two stages: the Human Rights Act (HRA), which allowed courts to declare
incompatibility between the Act and other laws;50 and the creation of a
Supreme Court, which consolidated most final HRA review into one body.51
Recently, Norway engaged in a similar reform. Although Norwegian courts
have long engaged in cautious constitutional review of legislation, the
constitution contained a very limited menu of rights protections.52 The
Norwegian parliament significantly expanded this list in an effort to “bring
of the Constitution] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 2009, 21379.
47 Hearing on A.N. no. 1599 Before the Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la
législation et de l’administration générale de la République [Commission on constitutional
law, legislation, and general administration of the Republic] (CR 58), 2008–2009 Leg., 13th
Sess. Ordinaire 10 (23 June 2009), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cloi/
08-09/c0809058.asp#P12_1410.
48 Loi spéciale modifiant l’article 26 de la loi spéciale 6 du janvier 1989 sur la Cour
d’arbitrage [Special Law Modifying Article 26 of the Special Law of January 1989] of July
12, 2009, MONITEUR BELGE [MB] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BELGIUM] July 31, 2009, 51617.
49 Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2009–2010, Séance du mardi 13 octobre 2009, Débats
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Oct. 13, 2009, p. 8572 (statement of Sen. Patrice Gélard).
50 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.).
51 Not all Scots cases are subject to final review by the Supreme Court. See Courts Reform
(Scotland) Act, 2014, (A.S.P. 18), § 117 (introducing the requirement that permission be
obtained to appeal civil cases); Scotland Act, 2012, c. 11 (U.K.) (providing that the High
Court of Justiciary, Scotland’s supreme criminal court, retains power to ultimately resolve
cases once the U.K. Supreme Court has determined the legal question at issue).
52 Anine Kierulf, Norway: Human Rights and Judicial Review Constitutionalized, INT’L J.
CONST. L. BLOG (June 5, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/06/norway-human-rightsand-judicial-review-constitutionalized.
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rights home,” constitutionalizing rights already protected by the ECHR and
domestic statutes as well as amending the constitution to explicitly authorize
judicial review.53 Like the French and Belgian parliaments, the Norwegian
parliament was concerned that Norwegians were relying too heavily on the
Convention in Norwegian courts and sought to make rights adjudication a
domestic matter.54
Other Nordic countries and the Netherlands have traditionally given little
space to constitutional review,55 however, parliaments are rethinking their
traditional stance under pressure from Europe.56 In 1992, the Danish
parliament voted to incorporate the ECHR into national law.57 The change
was accompanied by arguments that incorporation was necessary to avoid
censure at Strasbourg58—the type of defensive incorporation argument made
a few years later in the United Kingdom. In 2000, Finland overturned its
long-standing rule forbidding judicial review of legislation, allowing courts
to refuse to apply a law in cases in which doing so would be contrary to the
Basic Law or the Constitution.59 This reform followed the 1995 introduction
of new fundamental rights based on the ECHR and other treaties.60
This section will focus on the examples of the United Kingdom and
France. Both share a concern with parliamentary sovereignty and a
Id. This gesture suggests that Norwegian judges are seen as allies in the nationalization
of rights. This view may have merit; the Norwegian Supreme Court has sought to read the
Convention in light of “traditional Norwegian value priorities.” Geir Ulfstein & Andreas
Føllesdal, The European Court of Human Rights and the Norwegian Supreme Court:
Independence and Democratic Control, in THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES 247, 253 (N.A.
Engstad, A.L. Frøseth & B. Tønder eds., 2014).
54 Ulfstein & Føllesdal, supra note 52, at 253.
55 Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution, adopted in 1984, bans judicial review of
legislation. Jerfi Uzman, Tom Barkhuysen & Michiel L. van Emmerik, The Dutch Supreme
Court: A Reluctant Positive Legislator?, in NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE EIGHTEENTH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 423, 426 (J.H.M. van Erp & L.P.W. van
Vliet eds., 2010).
56 See Claes & van der Schoff, supra note 6, at 127–32 (describing a reform proposal in the
Netherlands). Some Dutch legislators have called for judicial review in cases affecting
“fundamental rights.” Gerhard van der Schoff, Constitutional Review by the Judiciary in the
Netherlands: A Bridge too Far?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 275, 282 (2010).
57 Jens Elo Rytter & Marlene Wind, In Need of Juristocracy? The Silence of Denmark in
the Development of European Legal Norms, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 470, 479 (2011).
58 Id.
59 Juha Lavapuro, Tuomas Ojanen & Martin Scheinin, Rights-Based Constitutionalism in
Finland and the Development of Pluralist Constitutional Review, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 505,
517–18 (2011).
60 Jaako Husa, Guarding the Constitutionality of Laws in the Nordic Countries: A
Comparative Perspective, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 345, 366 (2000).
53
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democratic deficit at the European level. The significant differences between
the common law and the French civil law tradition, as well as the political
differences between the two countries, make their choice of a similar
solution particularly striking.61 Because of a web of European treaties and
popular expectations, neither country can avoid subjecting legislation to
judicial review short of exiting the system. The only choice that is open to
them is whether and how to engage in rights review domestically. This
situation sets up the paradox whereby the reforms could be presented as
appealing to both pro- and anti-European sentiments. Pro-Europeans saw a
chance for further integration of values. In contrast, Euro-skeptics saw a
chance for reduced oversight by the ECtHR and CJEU; that is, more
attention to rights at the national level should prompt the transnational courts
to avoid intervening.
A. Why Would a Court Protect a Parliament: The Administrative Rights
Tradition
In the United Kingdom in particular, reform proponents tended to hail
from the more pro-Europe Labour Party. In France, reform efforts began
with the Socialists who might be less troubled by Strasbourg. However, the
Gaullists, who quite clearly viewed Europe as a threat, later took up the
banner of reform as well. New proposals from the British Conservative
Party show that it has largely adopted Labour’s strategy, perhaps to avoid
making significant changes to the law to appease a conservative base.62 Still,
the argument for empowering national courts was more than an argument
Unlike the French, the UK Constitution is based on a set of context-specific historical
conventions without a single anchoring text. But this difference is not as salient in the case of
rights law. The French Constitution includes no bill of rights, and constitutional rights today
flow from judicial elaboration of the Preamble as well as “fundamental principles of the laws
of the Republic,” which is as close to “the principles of the British Constitution” as it sounds.
Compare Richard J. Cummins, The General Principles of Law, Separation of Powers and
Theories of Judicial Decision in France, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 594, 609 (1986) (describing
the sources and scope of French constitutional law), with Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Though, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 843, 850–65 (1978) (discussing the evolution of seventeenth and eighteenth century
British “fundamental law”); R.C. Van Caenegen, Constitutional History: Chance or Grand
Design?, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 447, 543–54 (2009) (describing the basic principles of the
British Constitution). Judges in the two countries have different careers, training, and role
expectations.
62 See infra Part III.B.2.
61
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offered in bad faith by pro-European members seeking to win over
conservatives skeptical of rights review. Parliament’s sovereignty remains
abridged whether it approves reform or not. The only difference is whether
domestic or foreign judges do the abridging.
This difference is potentially significant to both countries because of the
historical relationship between domestic courts and the parliaments in both
Westminster and French-derived systems.63 These pure parliamentary
systems rejected the American-style tripartite separation of powers.
Parliament combined all three. Independent judges were to help the British
and French Parliaments effectively impose their will, and they did so in part
by scrutinizing the administration of the law by the bureaucracy.
Although France and Britain did not protect constitutional rights as such,
courts in the twentieth century protected human rights through administrative
law.
British judges developed the ultra vires and “Wednesbury
unreasonableness” doctrines, which limited bureaucratic power to that
clearly delegated by statute and not exercised in an “outrageous” manner.64
Similarly, the French Council of State developed the doctrine of service
public, which limits ways in which regulations can be imposed, balancing
individual and general interests in a manner quite similar to constitutional
proportionality doctrines.65 Courts striking down regulations did so in
Parliament’s name—Parliament, it was said, could never have intended its
laws to allow the agency in question to infringe on individual rights.66 This
history helps to explain why national courts might be expected to speak for
their parliaments when confronted with European law.

See VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 13 (2009).
See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. 1948 (K.B.) 223 (a
regulation will not survive scrutiny if it is “[s]o outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted
moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be
decided could have arrived at it”); Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service, [1985] I.C.R. 14.
65 See generally JACQUES CHEVALLIER, LE SERVICE PUBLIC (7th ed. 2008) (describing the
elaboration of this doctrine).
66
See, e.g., Nicholas Bamforth, Ultra Vires and Institutional Independence, in JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE CONSTITUTION 111, 116–19 (Christopher Forsyth ed., 2000) (describing how
theorists have grounded judicial review of administrative law in parliamentary sovereignty).
The French Council of State grew in importance and independence in concert with the
flourishing of parliamentary democracy in the Third Republic. STONE, supra note 11, at 32.
It was in this period that the Council laid claim to key administrative law concepts such as
misuse of power. See, e.g., Pariset, CE, Nov. 28, 1875, Rec. Lebon 47544.
63
64
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B. Rights Brought Home to London
The United Kingdom has responded to the growth of European rights law
in two steps: first, “bringing rights home,” and second, consolidating national
rights jurisprudence by creating a Supreme Court. Historically, the British
Constitution “could be summed up in just eight words ‘What the Queen in
Parliament enacts is law.’ ”67 But in 1966, the United Kingdom began
allowing citizens to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.68
Although they could not use the Convention directly as a source of law prior
to the HRA, lawyers cited the ECHR and relevant case law to UK courts.69
In 1972, the House of Lords held that the European Communities Act made
Community law directly applicable as part of national law, allowing it to
override acts of Parliament.70 The House of Lords put that law into effect
when it relied on EU law to “disapply” domestic law in the 1991 Factortame
case.71 That de facto loss of parliamentary sovereignty helped spur action on
the long-discussed bill of rights.72 In turn, the development of rights review
furthered the creation of a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.73
The 1998 Human Rights Act incorporates the ECHR into national law
and allows UK judges to review the legality of other laws through reference
to these rights.74 Judges cannot strike down legislation. If a law conflicts
with the HRA, a court may issue a “declaration of incompatibility,” which
then starts a process to change the law in Parliament.75 The Act was the
product of a long struggle to create some sort of written constitution, or at
least a bill of rights, for the United Kingdom. 76 Before the HRA, the United
Kingdom had one of the highest rates of review by, and of losses in front of,

BOGDANOR, supra note 63, at 13.
Id. at 58.
69 Id. at 10.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 57.
72 See ROBERT BLACKBURN, TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM 5–10 (1999) (describing early debates over the issue).
73 Alyssa S. King, Recent Development, A Supreme Court, Supreme Parliament, and
Transnational National Rights, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 245, 246–48 (2010).
74 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
75 MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 28 (2008).
76 BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 5.
67
68

16

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 44:1

the ECtHR. Politicians often attributed those rates to the country’s lack of a
domestic mechanism for handling rights questions.77
Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 (CRA),78 legislative,
executive, and judicial power was consolidated in Parliament. The judicial
branch was represented by the Law Lords who sat in the House of Lords as
legislators, and sat in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and on
the Privy Council as judges.79 The CRA ultimately removed them from the
legislature, giving them the title of “Justice.”80 The Government also sought
a separate building for the Court.81 That physical, as well as legal, separation
signals the importance of the courts and the Supreme Court’s status as a
separate branch of government.
The Supreme Court both promotes a new view of separation of powers
and unifies jurisdiction of almost all of the United Kingdom’s top courts, as
well as increases their visibility, continuing a theme from the HRA.82 Even
though the United Kingdom has kept its weak courts, which do not have the
power to definitively stop an Act of Parliament, their combination of the
HRA and the Supreme Court has raised the profile of constitutional review
and thus considerably raised the stakes of parliamentary non-compliance
with the ECHR.
1. Bringing Rights Home
Policy-makers began to seriously discuss a written bill of rights in the
post-war period.83 The issue first went to general debate in Parliament in
1975.84 The rise of rights jurisprudence at the European level, including the
See, e.g., Mary Baber, HOME AFFAIRS SECTION, THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997-8, H.C.
98/24, at 14; Samantha Besson, The Reception Process in Ireland and the United Kingdom, in
A EUROPE OF RIGHTS 31, 41 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
78 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.).
79 Id. § 24. By custom, Law Lords did not participate in legislative debate.
80 Id.
81 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A SUPREME COURT FOR
THE UNITED KINGDOM 12 (2003), http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/supreme.pdf.
82 See id. at 19–22.
83
See Peter Lanston Fitzgerald, An English Bill of Rights? Some Observations From Her
Majesty’s Former Colonies in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1239–46 (1982), for a discussion
of the pressure the international human rights movement—particularly as manifested in the
European Convention on Human Rights—exerted on the United Kingdom.
84 Id. at 1249. So began a long line of doomed legislation aimed at incorporating the ECHR
into national law. See Bill of Rights, 1974-5, H.C. Bill [59]; Bill of Rights Bill, 1980-1, H.C.
Bill [60]; Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Bill, 1985, 1985-6, H.L. Bill [21],
77
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United Kingdom’s losses in front of the European Court of Human Rights,
was instrumental in securing the HRA’s passage.85
It is plausible to tell a straightforward story in which change in the United
Kingdom came from a desire for institutional modernization and alignment
with Europe. Early supporters of Labour’s proposal also pointed out the gap
between the United Kingdom and the continent and even its former colonies,
suggesting that the country was behind the times.86
Supporters of the HRA presented the change in more nationalistic terms.
The Government showed great awareness that the choice presented to
legislators in the late 1990s was not between more judicial review or less
judicial review, but between review “at home” by UK judges or continued
embarrassment abroad. Even the name of the Government’s white paper on
the HRA, Rights Brought Home, demonstrates the importance given to the
localizing, rather than the harmonizing, aspect of the reform.87
Moreover, the HRA’s supporters argued that the European rights they
sought to incorporate into national law had a British origin, emphasizing
their country’s role in the ECHR drafting process.88 With the HRA, they
promised: “British judges will be enabled to make a distinctively British
contribution to the development of the jurisprudence of human rights in
Europe.”89 Issues that might have reached the European courts for want of
local jurisdiction might be resolved at home; whereas those that did reach the
supranational level might have a different quality.90 In this telling, British
judges are set against “European” judges, who are identified with European
Human Rights Bill, 1993-4, H.C. Bill [38] (requires that laws be interpreted so that they are
compatible with it); Human Rights Bill, 1994-5, H.L. Bill [5]; Human Rights Bill, 1996-7
[11].
85 Compare Labour Party, A Discussion Document on a Statutory Charter of Human Rights
(1976), reprinted in BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 917, 921, with HOME DEP’T, RIGHTS
BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997, Cm. 3782, ¶ 1.16, available at http://www.
archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/hoffice/rights/contents.htm.
86 Jean-François Flauss, Human Rights Act 1998: Kaleidoscope, 48 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL [FRENCH REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 695, 696 (2001).
87 HOME DEP’T, supra note 85, ¶ 1.14.
88 See 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1227f, reprinted in BLACKBURN, supra note
72, at 377.
89 HOME DEP’T, supra note 85, ¶ 1.14.
90 See Erin Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108
NW. U. L. REV. 543, 584–85 (2014) (noting that the HRA provided British courts with the
ability to opine on Convention-based claims ex ante, giving them the opportunity to explain
and distinguish the nature of the British practice at issue).
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law.91 Lord Kingsland argued that European judges did not understand
British practices, “which are, after all, unique.”92
Mike O’Brien,
Undersecretary for the Home Department, echoed these views, arguing that
UK courts interpreting the HRA “can assist in shaping those rights in a
manner sensitive to our country’s ways.”93 Lord Woolf, then Master of the
Rolls, took a similar view on an earlier, 1996, Human Rights Bill, noting that
the United Kingdom was “losing a real opportunity to influence the
European human rights jurisprudence.”94
Here the judge is linked tightly with local law as its representative and
promoter. The primary value of the HRA was not in creating rights—these
were already guaranteed at least in theory by the ECHR—but in allowing
local courts to intervene in how rights are protected in practice. This
emphasis on the influence of British judges helps explain why the creation of
a Supreme Court follows from rights legislation.
2. British Judges
“Modernization” was also a theme of arguments in favor of a supreme
court.95 The late Lord Bingham, one of the new court’s principle supporters
and himself, an influential judge, described the separation of powers as “a
cardinal aspect of a modern liberal democratic state governed by the rule of
law.”96 Meanwhile, the opposition relied on British exceptionalism to
explain why the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords should stay in
Parliament.97 The Supreme Court promotes a vision of the separation of
powers different from the one given by parliamentary sovereignty, which
emphasizes unified, rather than separated, power.98
King, supra note 73, at 246.
Quoted in BABER, supra note 77, at 26.
93 BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 412.
94 Id. at 813. Lord Woolf’s various responsibilities have included reforming the civil
procedure system of England and Wales. His voice, like those of Lords Lester and Bingham,
serves to underscore just how significant these arguments are in the British legal
establishment.
95 671 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) 13 (U.K.).
96
Anthony Lester, The Human Rights Act 1998 – Five Years On, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
258, 271 (2004) (quoting Lord Bingham of Cornhill).
97 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1221 (U.K.).
98 One example of this attitude is Lord Craig’s argument that removing the Law Lords from
Parliament weakens them because as long as they remain in the House of Lords, an “attack on
them individually or as a group would be an attack on Members of your Lordships’ House and
an affront to the primacy of Parliament.” 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1254 (U.K.).
91
92
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European jurisprudence pushed the United Kingdom towards a more
visible separation of powers. In McGonnell v. U.K., the ECtHR questioned
the unity of the judiciary and legislature, holding that the combination of
legislative and judicial roles was improper in a magistrate who served on a
planning commission whose actions he was later to judge.99 The House of
Lords can delay, but neither create nor veto legislation;100 and there was a
convention against Law Lords taking part in legislative deliberations.101
Still, several speakers worried that the ECtHR would eventually demand
reforms.102 Having a supreme court was a question of being understood by
the rest of Europe.103 A separate supreme court served to underscore the
independence of British judges to domestic and international observers alike
by making the highest court more visible.104
The Government also called for the creation of a “single apex” for the
national system.105 The HRA brought increased attention to UK
constitutional law.106 Creating the Supreme Court unified rights jurisdiction,
which until that point had been spread between the Lords and the Privy
Council.107 Under devolution, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland were
subject to Privy Council review for violations of the HRA.108 While the Law
Lords sat on both courts, they had separate jurisdiction, raising the possibility

McGonnell v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 289, 291 (2000). But see
MASTERMAN, supra note 26, at 80–84 (noting subsequent decisions have taken a more pragmatic
approach).
100 The Parliament Act, 1949, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13; see also The Parliament Acts, http://
www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/parliamentacts (discussing the removal of the House of
Lords’ veto power).
101 GRAEME BROADBENT, PUBLIC LAW DIRECTIONS 123 (2009) (noting the convention
against Law Lords taking part in the creation of legislation).
102 See, e.g., 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1217 (U.K.) (Lord Falconer citing an
instance in which a Law Lord, who had commented on legislation, was then unable to sit on a
judicial review).
103 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 11.
104 MASTERMAN, supra note 26, at 225.
105 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 20.
106 Id. at 11–12.
107 Id. at 10.
108 Aiden O’Neill, Judging Democracy: The Devolutionary Settlement and the Scottish
Constitution, in BUILDING THE UK’S NEW SUPREME COURT, supra note 8, at 23, 45; King,
supra note 73, at 247.
99
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that different panels in two similar cases could produce the equivalent of a
circuit split between them.109
As with the HRA, however, the nationalist argument for reform was also
present. Being understood by Europe is quite different from capitulating to
it. Having a unified court system and being understood matters because of
the expectation that UK judges can intercede in Europe on the country’s
behalf; their rulings forestalling further review. The argument for a supreme
court relates directly to the dichotomy between “British judges” and foreign
ones set up in the HRA debates. The HRA thrusts the UK judge in between
Parliament and Europe. Subsequent reforms aimed to make that judge a
more convincing representative.
Adopting the HRA has not settled the matter of how, if at all, the United
Kingdom should protect rights.110 Both the Brown and the Cameron
Governments have again taken up the issue of whether there should instead
be a British Bill of Rights.111 The possibility of “Brexit” from the European
Union will be put to a vote in June.112 However, even today’s Conservatives
are not prepared to leave the Council of Europe and the ECHR. Instead they
have now adopted Labour’s earlier strategy—defining rights domestically
and increasing the power of judges in hopes that a British view of rights will
Now, HRA violations pertaining to Scotland, like those involving England, may
ultimately be judged by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. See Anthony Bradley,
The Sovereignty of Parliament—Form or Substance?, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 25,
35, 59 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 7th ed. 2011); Lester, supra note 96, at 265.
Another potential source of a “circuit split” has not been removed, as the Supreme Court does
not have jurisdiction over Scottish criminal cases. O’Neill, supra note 108, at 43–44.
110 Even Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown suggested creating a British “bill of rights
and responsibilities.” MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: DEVELOPING OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, 2009, Cm. 7577, at 11–13 (U.K.). The Conservative-Liberal
Democrat Government that followed promptly took up the same issue. COMMISSION ON A
BILL OF RIGHTS, DO WE NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS? (2011), available at http://webarchive.natio
nalarchives.gov.uk/20130128112038/http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/cbr/cbr-dis
cussion-paper.pdf. The issue is once again on Parliament’s agenda. Human Rights and
Prisoner Voting: Key Issues for the 2015 Parliament, http://www.parliament.uk/business/pub
lications/research/key-issues-parliament-2015/justice/human-rights-and-prisoner-voting.
111 For instance, they characterize the ECHR as an “entirely sensible statement of the
principles which should underpin any modern democratic nation. Indeed the UK had a great
influence on the drafting of the Convention, and was the first nation to ratify it.” Protecting
Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human
Rights Law, CONSERVATIVE PARTY (GB), https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/down
loadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf.
112 Economist Data Team, A Background Guide to “Brexit” from the European Union,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphicsbritain-s-referendum-eu-membership..
109
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prevail. The Conservative proposal for a British Bill of Rights explicitly
states that it will transpose the ECHR into a bill of rights act, just as the HRA
did.113 However, the Conservatives insist that their bill will be different
because it does not instruct judges to follow ECtHR judgments as well as the
ECHR.114 Given that British judges operate in a precedent-based legal
system and that appeal to the ECtHR would remain open, these changes
appear to be cosmetic.
C. Dirty French Laundry
The Fifth Republic Constitution created France’s Constitutional Council
in 1958 to help define the division of power in France’s semi-presidential
system.115 The Council’s mandate soon expanded. The 1958 Constitution
included no discussion of rights in its operative clauses; these rights were
read into the constitution through Council decisions interpreting the
Preamble starting in 1971.116 At first, only a select group of political leaders,
including the President, the Prime Minister, and the heads of both houses of
Parliament could refer a law to the Council.117 In 1974, Parliament expanded
access to the Council to allow sixty senators or deputies to send a new law to
the Council for review; this soon became a common way to challenge
legislation.118 The legislative majority, which is also typically the party that
holds the presidency, controls the lawmaking process.119 Parliamentary
minorities check the majority and contribute to law creation through their
power to submit laws to the Council for abstract review and through the
credible threat that they will use it.120 Until 2010, the Council engaged only
in this abstract review.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5.
115 1958 CONST. arts. 56–63 (Fr.).
116 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 71-44DC, July 18,
1971, Rec. 29; Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 73-51DC,
Dec. 27, 1973, Rec. 25 (first decision to make specific reference to the Declaration of the
Rights of Man); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC,
Jan. 16, 1975, Rec. 19 (referring to 1946 constitution when deciding challenge to abortion
law); STONE, supra note 11, at 66–69.
117 WILLIAM G. ANDREWS, PRESIDENTUAL GOVERNMENT IN GAULLIST FRANCE: A STUDY OF
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS 1958–1974, at 116 (1982).
118 STONE, supra note 11, at 53–59.
119 Id. at 121.
120 Id. at 120–22.
113
114
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As a result of French treaty obligations, Parliament and the President
controlled constitutional, but not judicial, review. French litigants could seek
concrete review of legislation only under supra-national law because the
French constitution directly incorporates treaty law into national law.121 The
Constitutional Council declined to exercise review under the ECHR in
1975.122 The other two supreme courts stepped in: the Court of Cassation
took up ECHR review the same year;123 the Council of State waited until
1989.124 In 1981, France acceded to the optional protocol allowing
individuals to appeal their cases to the ECtHR.125
President François Mitterrand first proposed the constitutional question
procedure on July 14, 1989, presenting it as giving citizens a new right to
constitutional protection.126 The Gaullists in the Senate blocked the
proposal, but twenty years later, a Gaullist parliament passed a similar
proposal.127 It resurfaced, and failed again, at the end of President
Mitterrand’s term.128 Constitutional reform was again at issue in the 2007
presidential election, and shortly after taking office, President Sarkozy

121 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.) (general provision incorporating international treaties). See
also 1958 CONST. art. 88 (concerning the transposition of EU law).
122 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC, Jan. 15,
1975, Rec. 19, considérants 3–7 (Fr.).
123 This court breaks “ties” resulting from circuit splits among France’s general appellate
courts.
124 SocCh. mixte, 24 mai 1975, aff. sté. Jacques Vabre, Bull. civ. C.M. n° 4 p. 6; D.1975.497
concl. Touffait [hereinafter Jacques Vabre]; CE Sect., Oct. 20, 1989, Rec. Lebon 190,
Frydman [hereinafter Nicolo].
125 Elizabeth Lambert Abdelgawad & Ann Weber, The Reception Process in France and
Germany, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 105, 109.
126 Projet de loi constitutionnelle n°1203 portant révision des articles 61, 62 et 63 de la
Constitution et instituant un contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois par voie d’exception
[Proposed Amendment revising articles 61, 62, and 63 of the constitution by Instituting
Constitutional Review on an Exceptional Basis] Mar. 30, 1990 (Fr.).
127 Constance Grewe, L’élargissement de la saisine du Conseil constitutionnel, [Enlarging
the Constituional Council’s Jurisdiction], in LA REVISION DE LA CONSTITUTION : JOURNEES
D’ETUDES DES 20 MARS ET 16 DECEMBRE 1992 [Constituional Reform: Symposia of March 20
and Dec. 16, 1992] 235, 240 (1993).
128 RAPPORT REMIS AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE LE 15 FEVRIER 1993 PAR LE COMITE
CONSULTATIF POUR LA REVISION DE LA CONSTITUTION [Report to the President of the Republic
on February 15, 1993 from the Consultative Committee on Constitutional Revision], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [Official Gazette of France] [J.O.], Feb. 16, 1993,
2537 [hereinafter 1993 Report], available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/stor
age/rapports-publics/0840 00091/0000.pdf.
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created a committee on institutional reform.129 In a few months’ time, the
committee produced a report entitled “A More Democratic Fifth Republic,”
which included the suggestions for concrete constitutional review that the
Gaullists had once opposed.130 The final law allows litigants to raise a
constitutional question related to individual rights at any stage in the
proceedings.131 The claims are subject to review by the judge in front of
whom the question is raised and are then sent to the Court of Cassation or
Council of State, depending on whether the proceedings are “ordinary” or
“administrative.”132 Those courts determine whether or not to send the
question to the Constitutional Council, which will then decide the issue.133 A
party seeking to raise a rights question must raise a constitutional question
prior to asking for a decision under European or Community law.134 The
resulting law aims to give the French constitution primacy, while
consolidating review authority in the Constitutional Council.
1. Unfinished Integration
Since President Mitterrand first introduced the priority question
procedure, there has been a distinct paradox in the reforms’ presentation.
Although reform was a matter of protecting France, it was also about keeping
up with the neighbors by doing as they do.135 Even in 1990, such an
institution could be presented as part of a model of constitutionalism shared

129 Nicolas Sarkozy, President of Fr., Address at Épinal (July 12, 2007), http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/077002273.html.
130 COMITE DE REFLEXION ET DE PROPOSITION SUR LA MODERNISATION ET LE REEQUILIBRAGE
DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA VE REPUBLIQUE [Committee of Reflection and Proposition on the
Modernization and Recalibration of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic], UNE VE
REPUBLIQUE PLUS DEMOCRATIQUE [A More Democratic Fifth Republic] 68 (2008), available at
http://www.comite-constitutionnel.fr/telechargements/Rapport_du_comite_une_Ve_Republiq
ue_plus_democratique.pdf.
131 Loi 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009 relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de la
Constitution [Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009, Relative to the Application of Article
61-1 of the Constitution] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], Dec. 11, 2009, 21379, ch. II § 1, art. 23-1.
132 Id. at ch. II § 1, art. 23-2.
133 Id.
134 Id. at ch. II § 1, art. 23-2(3).
135 Commentators such as Constance Grewe have presented the French reform as
Europeanization, a step towards the creation of a German or Italian style constitutional court.
Grewe, supra note 127, at 237–38.
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by “all the great democracies” or, at least, many of the European ones.136
Lacking such a system, France was an outlier.137 Such a status suggested
that it ought to change to keep up with its counterparts. Justice Minister
Pierre Arpaillange claimed that the reform would return France to the “rank
that must be its own, that is to say the first, in the domain of protection of
human rights.”138 Failing to protect rights in this way threatened the French
government’s standing in Europe and in the eyes of its own people.
In 1993, the Vedel Committee on constitution reform noted that the time
was ripe for reform due to the “evolution of French democracy,” and pointed
to France’s “unfinished” integration into the European order.139 The
committee treated citizen initiative in the protection of constitutional rights
through litigation as the normative model—a standard countries in the New
Europe had to meet.140 The idea of reform as evolution was also present in
legislative debate in which parliamentarians sought signs of convergence.141
One deputy spoke approvingly of the “progressive harmonization” of
European legal norms, calling it necessary as a uniform guarantee of the rule
of law.142

Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, 2e séance du mardi le
24 avril 1990, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 24, 1990, 604 (statement of Deputy Michel Sapin,
Président du commission des lois [Chairman of the Law Committee]).
137 Id. at 594 (statement of Justice Minister Pierre Arpaillange). Assemblée Nationale,
Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, 2e séance du mercredi le 25 avril 1990, Débats
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REEPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Apr. 25, 1990, 667 (statement of Deputy Gérard Gouzes).
138 Parlimentary Debate, supra note 136, at 593 (statement of Justice Minister Pierre
Arpaillange).
139 1993 Report, supra note 128, at 2547.
140 See id.
141 Sénat, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1992–1993, séance du mardi le 26 mai 1993,
Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 26, 1993, 442 (statement of Sen. Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt);
Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1992–1993, 3me séance du mardi le 22
juin 1993, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 22, 1993, 2046, 2048, 2057, 2059 (statements of
Deputies Jacques Floch, Jean-Jacques Hyest & Jean-Pierre Michel).
142 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1992–1993, 3e séance du mardi le
22 juin 1993, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 22, 1993, p. 2056 (statement of Deputy José Rossi).
136
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2. Rights at Home Rhetoric
When President Mitterrand introduced his reform in 1989, supranational
law was not as significant a factor as it is today. But by April 1990, when
Parliament was ready to discuss Constitutional Council reform, the situation
had begun to change. The Council of State had demonstrated its willingness
to use treaty law to disapply domestic legislation in Nicolo.143 Shortly after
debates over constitutional review began, the Strasbourg court handed
France its first defeat in a case about government wire-tapping.144 The UN
Human Rights Committee in Geneva had also recently censured France.145
Those decisions provided a new rationale for reform, which the Prime
Minister seized on in his opening remarks, explaining that he preferred
sanction by French judges to “the humiliation of being sanctioned in Geneva,
or, moreover, in a supranational court, at Strasbourg.”146
Like the Prime Minister, some deputies treated constitutional review as if
it would be a substitute for review under the ECHR, although nothing would
have prevented both from operating simultaneously.147 Better “to wash your
dirty laundry at home,” some Senators said.148 Others understood that
European law would stay in the legal system, even with the creation of
concrete constitutional review.149 They were concerned about the effects of

143 Sénat, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, séances du mardi le 12 juin et mercredi
le 13 juin 1990, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 12–13, 1990, 1513, 1551 (statements of Sens.
Jacqueline Freysse-Cazalis & Paul Masson regarding Nicolo).
144 Id. at 1502 (statement of Justice Minister Pierre Arpaillange); Assemblée Nationale,
Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, séance du jeudi le 21 juin 1990, Débats
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], June 21, 1990, 2772 (statement of Deputy Pierre Mazeaud).
145 April 24, 1990 Parliamentary Debate, supra note 136, at 591 (statement of Prime
Minister Michel Rocard) (referencing the cases). This issue was later taken up by the Council
of State. MARCEAU LONG ET AL., LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE
884–85 (15th ed. 2005).
146 April 24, 1990 Parliamentary Debate, supra note 136, at 591 (statement of Prime
Minister Michel Rocard).
147 See, e.g., id. at 615 (statement of Deputy Francis Colcombat) (“France is constantly
condemned by the Strasbourg court”).
148 June 12, 1990 Parliamentary Debate, supra note 143, at 1525 (statement of Sen. Michel
Dreyfus-Schmidt); see also id. at 1526 (statement of Sen. Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt).
149 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, 2e séance du mercredi
le 25 avril 1990, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
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the Constitutional Council’s 1975 decision to leave application of the ECHR
to other courts.150
Subsequent debates followed a similar path. The 1993 debates repeated
many of the themes from 1990, targeting European and EU (then,
Community) law.151 Deputies complained that as lower courts made use of
the ECHR, the hierarchy of norms, of which the constitution was supposed to
be the apex, had fallen into disarray.152 To correct the problem, they insisted,
one constitutional court should be given control over rights subject to diffuse
review.153
The theme of resistance to European law resurfaced in more recent
debates. The 2008 Senate Law Committee hearings soon focused on the
hierarchy of norms. Former Constitutional Councilor Jean-Claude Colliard
critiqued the bill as allowing other courts to exercise constitutional review.154
Former Justice Minister Badinter complained of the ECHR: “We could not
live perennially with a system in which French courts can become censors of
laws by invoking the European Convention on Human Rights . . . but could
not censor laws based on the protection of fundamental rights inscribed in
the Constitution.”155 Having reversed his previous position, President
Sarkozy attended the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Constitutional
Council and highlighted the reform, telling the assembled crowd, “I prefer
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], J.O., Apr. 25, 1990, 662 (statement of Deputy JeanPierre Mazeaud).
150 Id. at 614 (statement of Deputy Jacques Barrot); April 24, 190 Parliamentary Debate,
supra note 136, at 662, 666 (statements of Deputies Jean-Pierre Mazeaud and Gérard Gouzes).
But see Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989-1990, 1re séance du mardi
le 24 avril 1990, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 24, 1990, p. 599 (statement by Deputy Michel
Sapin) (arguing that allowing the Council to consider treaties such as the ECHR would lead to
significant changes in French case law and should be avoided).
151 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1992–1993, 3e séance du mardi le
22 juin 1993, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 22, 1993, 2056–58 (statements of Deputies José Rossi
and Jean-Pierre Michel). Today, Article 88 gives special status to Community law, but at the
time, both sources of supranational law had equal status. Politicians regularly confuse the two
in debate.
152 Id. at 2063 (statement of Deputy Arnaud Cazin d’Honincthun).
153
Id.
154 Hearing on Constitutional Reform Before the Commission des Lois, Sénat, 2008–2009
Leg., 13th Sess. Ordinaire (2008), available at http://www.senat.fr/bulletin/20080526/lois.ht
ml#toc2.
155 Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2007-2008, séance du mardi le 24 juin 2008, Débats
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], June 24, 2008, p. 3356 (statement of Sen. Robert Badinter).
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that our laws are censured based on our Constitution rather than based on
international or European conventions.”156
Discussions of the organic law that implements the judicial review
amendment raised similar issues. Law Committee hearings in the Senate and
National Assembly asked how the procedures for constitutional adjudication
would affect the use of the ECHR and EU law.157 Early drafts of the organic
law did not specify how a judge had to respond to constitutional question
motions compared to others based on European and Community law. In the
National Assembly hearings, experts and deputies attacked this provision as
potentially allowing an escape hatch through which judges might avoid the
constitutional question.158 The “hierarchy of norms” needed to be reflected
in procedure.159 They had to end the “paradox”160 and “contradiction”161 in
which citizens were used to invoking European rights rather than French
ones. Deputies remained concerned that the law would not assure priority
for the French Constitution.162 The way to end that contradiction was to put
the Constitutional Council at the top of a hierarchy of courts that paralleled
the hierarchy of norms and to make it the first stop for litigants that invoked
their rights. The final design of the organic laws that give priority to
Guy Canivet, Constitutional Councilor, La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité ou le
“ravissement” du constitutionnaliste, Address at the University of Montpellier (Sept. 11,
2009), ¶ 16.
157 Hearing on Constitutional Reform Before the Commission des Lois, Sénat, Session
Ordinaire de 2008–2009 (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.senat.fr/bulletin/20090921/
lois.html#toc3; Hearing on A.N. no. 1599 Before the Commission des Lois Constitutionnelles,
de l’administration générale de la République (CR 58), Session Ordinaire de 2008–2009 (June
23, 2009), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cloi/08-09/c0809058.pdf;
Hearing on A.N. no. 1599 Before the Commission des Lois Constitutionnelles, de
l’administration générale de la République (CR 63), Session Ordinaire de 2008–2009 (June
30, 2009), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cloi/08-09/c0809063.pdf.
158 See Statement of Deputy Jean-Pierre Mazeaud, supra note 149.
159 Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2009-2010, séance du mardi le 13 octobre, Débats
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Oct. 13, 2009, 8559, 8565 (statements of Sens. Jean-Marie Bockel and François
Zocchetto).
160 Id. at 8565 (statement of Sen. Zocchetto).
161 Id. at 8567 (statement of Sen. Robert Badinter).
162 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Extraordinaire de 2008–2009, 1re séance du
lundi le 14 septembre 2009, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Sept. 14, 2009, 7042–43 (statements of
Deputies Patrick Braouezec and Jean-Christophe Lagarde) (concern that litigants will not
choose ECHR over constitutional review).
156
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constitutional issues leaves little doubt that it meant to cause the litigant to
favor internal norms.163
Like the British, French conservatives did not subsequently reconcile
themselves to ECtHR review. Center-right deputies recently attempted to
introduce a resolution instructing the government to renegotiate the terms of
the ECtHR’s jurisdiction.164 However, the resolution quickly failed in the
National Assembly where the left maintains a slim majority.165
The UK and French reforms offer two particularly striking examples of
countries with strong parliamentary traditions in which parliaments sought to
empower national judges. In both countries, reform was presented as
simultaneous integration of national law into the European legal system and
protection of the national law from Europe. Parliament’s old allies against
the local bureaucracy might be new allies against the transnational one, and
in particular, against international courts with insufficient regard for local
traditions. Paradoxically, this position required adopting a European
concept—judicial review, and in the case of the United Kingdom, “bringing
home” European rights. Although presented as a way of preventing outside
meddling, this approach achieved one of the ECHR’s goals by providing
more rights’ protection at the national level.
IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF DOMESTIC REFORM
Several years have passed since the UK Supreme Court moved out of
Westminster and down the street to Middlesex Guildhall and since the
Constitutional Council issued its first decision in response to a priority
constitutional question. Have they promoted national values or European
ones? The answer depends on how and whom one asks.
Loi organique 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009 relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de
la constitution [Organic Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009, Relative to the Application of
Article 61-1 of the Constitution] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 2009, 21379, ch. II § 1, art. 23-2(3).
164 Proposition de résolution invitant le Gouvernement à renégocier les conditions de saisine
et les compétences de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme (CEDH) sur les questions
touchant notamment à la sécurité nationale et à la lutte contre le terrorisme. [Proposed
Resolution inviting the Government to Renegotiate the Conditions for Referrals and
Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Notably on Questions Related
to National Security and the Fight against Terrorism], Assemblée Nationale, Feb. 18, 2015,
available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/propositions/pion2601.asp.
165 ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, SESSION ORDINAIRE DU 2014-2015, SEANCES DU JEUDI LE 2 AVRIL
2015, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 2, 2015, 3457.
163
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The reforms discussed above reflect the shared expectation that the
ECtHR is actively seeking to expand its reach. Parliament also assumed that
national judges would seek to guard their terrain from interference by the
ECtHR. Within this assumption seems to be the idea that national courts will
interpret rights in a manner that parliamentarians and the public find more
congenial. This view has merit. Judges on the UK Supreme Court have
openly criticized Strasbourg for overstepping its bounds, and substituting its
judgment not only for the national legislature’s, but for their courts’ as
well.166 Apex courts within a domestic political order remain tied and
responsive to national politics through a variety of mechanisms. In the very
act of creating new review powers, parliaments have demonstrated their
willingness and ability to alter those courts’ jurisdiction. Appointment
processes also involve political choices. In the United Kingdom, review
under the HRA gives Parliament an important role.167 In France, legislation
or constitutional amendment are possible responses to a constitutional
decision—something of which constitutional judges are well aware.168
However, those ties do not guarantee that national judges will prefer
national norms. The ECHR gives national judges the ability to refuse to
apply legislation that threatens human rights. Lacking other mechanisms,
judges in systems of strong parliamentary sovereignty will find that power
especially valuable.169 Litigants know that the ultimate destination of a claim
may still be Strasbourg. Additionally, CJEU and ECtHR case law prevents
the UK Supreme Court and French Constitutional Council from blocking
resort to these courts for rights review. The Lisbon Treaty may restrict
166 Lord Leonard Hoffmann, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture: The Universality of
Human Rights, ¶¶ 15, 22–28, 39, 44 (Mar. 19, 2009), available at https://www.judiciary.gov.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_Annual_Lecture_Universality_of_Hu
man_Rights.pdf; see also Stjin Smet, President of Belgian Constitutional Court Criticizes
European Court of Human Rights, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (May 17, 2010), http://strasbourg
observers.com/2010/05/17/president-of-belgian-constitutional-court-criticizes-european-courtof-human-rights/ (President Marc Bossuyt stating that he agrees with Lord Hoffman that
Strasbourg fails to respect its “double subsidiary nature” to national legislatures and national
courts).
167 See supra Part III.B.
168 See, e.g., Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2015-713 DC,
23 July, 2014, Rec. 2751, paras. 2–3 (spelling out the responsibility of the legislature and
President for safeguarding rights). The Council repeated that Parliament enjoys wide
discretion when legislating on rights. The French Constitution has also been amended
repeatedly throughout the life of the Fifth Republic.
169 King, supra note 73, at 249.
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attempts by the UK Supreme Court or French Constitutional Council to
block questions of EU law referred by lower courts. Although France may
give the constitutional question procedural priority, the ECtHR does not.
The only way to alter this relationship would be through efforts at
jurisdiction-stripping at the Council of Europe level. The UK attempted to
lead one such effort, but it was unsuccessful. As a result, neither the UK
Supreme Court nor the French Constitutional Council have the only, or the
last, word on rights within their borders.
Instead, these jurisdictions are left with the continued ambiguity of what
many have termed “judicial dialogue.” At the transnational level, the
dialogue is stilted because the ECtHR takes so long to respond.170 But
lawyers and judges at the national level are constantly choosing the sources
of law they refer to in petitioning for appeal and in adjudicating rights. They
control the dialogue by deciding whether they view national and
international versions of rights as being in harmony or conflict. Here, too,
nationalists will be disappointed. To the extent that their objections to
European rights were not merely to form, but to substance, putting national
courts in charge never could satisfy them. Although national court
judgments may convince Strasbourg that there exists a margin of
appreciation, national rights adjudication takes place within European
bounds. The UK Supreme Court recognizes the ECHR’s influence directly
and gives itself only a limited scope for resisting ECtHR interpretations. The
French Constitutional Council mostly has avoided explicitly referring to the
ECHR in either its judgments or in the accompanying dossier, but its reading
of the rights protected by the French Constitution corresponds with the
ECHR.
A. The Failure of a Blocking Mechanism
The European context in which they remain embedded limits the ability
of national courts to block review in Strasbourg, even if they wanted to.
Purely local reform simply cannot alter that. UK Conservatives eventually
realized as much, and proposed stripping jurisdiction from the ECtHR.
However, they found that other member states had little appetite for strong
measures and had to settle for merely reiterating the principle of subsidiarity.
170 See ISUFI Int’l Assocs., Preparing a Case for the European Court of Human Rights,
HG.ORG, http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=4832 (noting the current backlog prevents the
ECtHR from reviewing applications for about one year).
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1. Treaty Obligations Remain
Prioritizing constitutional over transnational law may itself violate treaty
obligations. Judges in France scrutinized the constitutional question
procedure as a possible violation because it would retard a litigant’s ability to
vindicate his or her EU rights as had occurred in Belgium, which had
adopted similar reforms.171 The CJEU ruled that interlocutory constitutional
question procedure is invalid “so far as the priority nature of that procedure
prevents . . . all the other national courts or tribunals [besides the
constitutional court] from exercising their right or fulfilling their obligation
to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.” 172
Because EU law includes the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is very
similar to the ECHR, and because the CJEU has incorporated the ECHR in
its “general principles of EU law,” a preliminary rights ruling for a
transnational court remains a possibility.
At the same time that reforms are too strong for Luxembourg, they may
be too weak for Strasbourg. The UK Supreme Court cannot strike down an
act of Parliament. The ECtHR held in the 2002 case, Hobbs v. United
Kingdom, that a declaration of incompatibility with the HRA did not offer a

Called to provide an opinion on the constitutionality of the proposed law, the Belgian
Council of State analyzed the proposed legislation in light of the CJEU’s Simmenthal
decision, which discussed the relation of ordinary national law to community law and insisted
on the primacy of the latter. Avis du Conseil d’Etat [CE], 3 Mar. 2009, No. 45.905, ¶ 7
(Belg.). It mapped a way in which a national court might seek to circumvent the
constitutional question by reviewing the law on constitutional question procedure for
conventionality and sending a question to the CJEU. Id. ¶¶ 5–8. Soon after their respective
constitutional questions were put in place, the Courts of Cassation in both Belgium and France
raised the issue of whether the question violated EU treaties by giving priority to the
constitutional court and limiting their ability to seize the CJEU. Cases C-188/10 and
C-189/10, Melki v. France, 2010 E.C.R. I-05667; Case C-457/05, Chartry v. Belgium, 2011
E.C.R. I-00819; Guy Carcassonne & Nicolas Molfessis, La Cour de cassation à l'assaut de la
question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, LE MONDE (PARIS), Apr. 23, 2010. The CJEU heard
both cases and decided the French case first, holding that the constitutional question could
avoid violating EU law only if all French courts remained free to refer cases to the CJEU, to
provide provisional protection for EU rights, including fundamental rights under the Charter
(identical to the ECHR), and to refuse to apply law contrary to EU law. Melki, 2010 E.C.R. I05667, ¶ 76.
172 Melki, 2010 E.C.R. I-05667, ¶ 57.
171
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sufficient domestic remedy because it is not binding on the parties and
because it does not require Parliament to amend its legislation.173
Meanwhile, France has adopted a model that gives several judges
discretion as to whether a petition reaches the constitutional court. This type
of discretionary petition does not necessarily meet the ECHR’s standard for
domestic remedy. In Horvat v. Croatia, the ECtHR held that a petition to
that country’s constitutional court was not a domestic remedy to be
exhausted because the court had discretion over whether to the hear the case
and because a successful petition had to meet several other criteria, such as
the requirement that the petitioner’s rights were “grossly violated.”174 This
formulation did not create a sufficiently certain domestic remedy that
petitioners could be required to exhaust before going to the ECtHR.175
France introduced multiple levels of discretionary, rather than mandatory,
review because it is up to the judge and then, to the Court of Cassation and
Council of State to decide whether to submit a constitutional question up the
chain to the Constitutional Council.176 Manifest violation or non-violation
may prove no less ambiguous than “gross violation” in the ECtHR’s eyes.
However, the ECtHR used the same case to announce that it considered the
practical, as well as de jure, availability of the remedy or hearing.177 These
jurisdictions may fare better on that scale.
EU and European doctrines combine to undermine any blocking potential
the reforms may have. They underscore how little the solution of judicial
review accords with the rhetoric that accompanied its adoption. Introducing
more rights review at the national level does not preclude ECtHR review.178
Nor does it allow national courts to take and maintain an attitude toward
rights fundamentally different from Strasbourg’s without censure. Domestic,
supreme or constitutional courts have greater capacity that can be used to
173 Hobbs v. United Kingdom, App. No. 63684/00, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54 (2002). However,
if a court has the option of reading down legislation to make it compliant with the HRA, the
ECtHR considers this reading a remedy that must be exhausted before it will hear the case.
Upton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29800/04, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 (2006).
174 Horvat v. Croatia, App. No. 51585/99, 6, ¶¶ 41–42 (2001).
175 Id. at 6–7, ¶ 43.
176
The Council’s Secretary General pointed this out early on. Marc Guillaume, Question
Prioritaire de Constitutionnalité et Convention Européenne des Droits de L’Homme, 32 LES
NOUVEAUX CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 67, 91–92 (2011).
177 Horvat, App. No. 51585/99, at 7.
178 On this issue in France, see Constance Grewe, Contrôle de constitutionnalité et contrôle
de conventionalité: à la recherche d'une frontière introuvable, 100 REVUE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT
CONSTITUTIONNEL 961, 962 (2014).
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resolve rights disputes, but that does not necessarily mean they will reduce
the burden on the ECtHR.179
2. Seeking a Wider Margin
From a nationalist perspective, the constitutional changes I described
would be more successful if they matched a renewed commitment to the
principle of subsidiarity and a wide margin of appreciation. Adopted
unanimously in April 2012, the Council of Europe’s Brighton Declaration
changes the preamble to the ECHR to enshrine the principle of
subsidiarity.180 It also includes detailed instructions describing how member
states would like the ECtHR to enact this principle. As long as they do not
appear in the form of an additional protocol, the court is free to ignore these
instructions, and Sir Nicholas Bratza, the UK judge and then President of the
ECtHR, announced his intention to do as much.181 However, the declaration
shows one direction the push for national judicial review could take and
exemplifies an effort to broaden the trend.
The Brighton Declaration was primarily the work of the UK Government,
which sought to strip ECtHR jurisdiction.182 In February 2012, newspapers
179 The UK Supreme Court began sitting in October 2009. Thus far, it has received a total of
612 applications, most of which were refused. It has issued 183 judgments, including
judgments on issues unrelated to the HRA. THE SUPREME COURT ANNUAL REPORT AND
ACCOUNTS 2011–2012, at 22–23; THE SUPREME COURT ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS
2010–2011, at 22; THE SUPREME COURT ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2009–2010 HC 64,
at 23, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/news/annual-report.html. The French
Constitutional Council has issued 435 decisions on constitutional questions. CONSEIL
CONSTITUTIONNEL, QUESTION PRIORITAIRE DU CONSTITUTIONNALITE, http://www.conseil-consti
tutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-type/les-decisions-qpc.48
300.html.
180 Brighton Declaration, Eur. Ct. H.R. art. 12(b), 3 (2012).
181 Owen Bowcott, European Court of Human Rights President Criticizes UK Reforms, THE
GUARDIAN (Manchester), Apr. 19, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/apr/19/europea
n-court-human-rights-uk-reforms?newsfeed=true.
182 Vaughne Miller & Alexander Horne, The UK and Reform of the European Court of Human
Rights, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, Mar. 29, 2012, available at http://www.parliament.uk/bri
efing-papers/SN06277; David Cameron, Speech on the European Court of Human Rights (Jan.
25, 2012), in THE GUARDIAN (Manchester), Jan. 2012, http://www.theguardian.co.uk/law/2012/
jan/25/cameron-speech-european-court-human-rights-full?intcmp=239. It has the support of at
least some HRA advocates. Anthony Lester, The European Court of Human Rights Needs These
British Reforms, THE GUARDIAN (Manchester), Mar. 13, 2012, http://www.theguardian.co.uk/co
mmentisfree/2012/mar/13/court-human-rights-needs-british-reforms.
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in the United Kingdom and France obtained a leaked document outlining the
Cameron Government’s strategy for reforming the ECtHR.
The
memorandum outlines a number of reforms aimed at nationalizing rights and
judicial review, presented as a way to reduce the ECtHR’s caseload.183 It
would have limited ECtHR involvement to cases in which the national court
made a manifest error or in which the ECHR question was of grave
importance.184 The final declaration does not include this provision,
replacing it with threatening language, but no jurisdiction stripping.
The Brighton Declaration raises two factors contributing to the ECtHR’s
untenable workload: weak national institutions and an interventionist
court.185 This characterization encompasses the human rights demands of the
East and the democratic angst of the West.186 The declaration’s insistence on
sovereignty and the plethora of articles specifically mentioning national
institutions make clear that national governments, and not the ECtHR, should
play the leading role in rights protection. National governments should also
typically be the exclusive source of such protections. The declaration calls
on member states who lack an “independent National Human Rights
Institution” to create one.187 The parties were careful not to specify that the
institution be a court, but this expectation is implicit in calls for “new
domestic legal remedies, whether of a specific or general nature.”188

See James Landale, UK Presses for European Human Rights Convention Changes, BBC
NEWS, Feb. 29, 2012, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-17201024 (discussing
the leaked position paper known as the Brighton Draft).
184 Id.
185 See Brighton Declaration, supra note 180, arts. 6–7.
186 As Article 3 makes evident, the Declaration aims both to empower and to constrain
national actors:
The States Parties and the Court share responsibility for realizing the
effective implementation of the Convention, underpinned by the fundamental
principle of subsidiarity. The Convention was concluded on the basis, inter
alia, of the sovereign equality of States. States Parties must respect the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, and must effectively resolve
violations at the national level. The Court acts as a safeguard for violations
that have not been remedied at the national level. Where the Court finds a
violation, States Parties must abide by the final judgment of the Court.
Id. art. 3. The last two sentences temper the aggressive language of the first three, as does
Article 7, which calls for national courts to take the convention into account. Id. arts. 3, 7,
9(a)–(c), 10, 11, 12(a)–(c).
187 Id. art. 9(c)(i).
188 Id. art. 9(c)(iii).
183

2015]

NEW JUDICIAL REVIEW IN OLD EUROPE

35

Increased national attention to the Convention’s values is to be coupled with
decreased attention from Strasbourg.189
A watered-down Brighton Declaration has been incorporated into
Protocol 15, amending the ECHR’s preamble to state that “the High
Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the
primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this
Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a
margin of appreciation.”190 It accomplishes only the mildest jurisdiction
stripping—reducing by two months the time that parties have to file.191 It
sits somewhat uneasily next to Protocol 16, which allows national judges to
refer questions to Strasbourg for advisory opinions.192 Such a provision
might encourage national courts to avoiding taking responsibility for hard
cases through a well-timed reference. Lower courts using this protocol
might also bypass the national apex courts, frustrating legislative attempts to
restore a hierarchy of norms.
B. Dialogues and Monologues
The expectation that national courts can substitute for international ones
actually involves a set of assumptions favorable to European norms. For
review under the national constitution to replace review under the ECHR,
whether by local judges or at Strasbourg, the rights protection offered under
constitutional law must be at least as robust as that under the ECHR. And it
must be done in a manner similar enough to the ECtHR’s approach to rights
protection that even foreign judges sitting in Strasbourg can agree that it is as
protective of the same fundamental rights. Only then can the new
constitutional review take the place of convention review. Viewed in this
light, the claims made by UK and French reformers are not contradictory—

See id. art. 11.
Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature June 24, 2013, C.ET.S. No. 213, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_15_ENG.pdf; see also Comm. of Ministers,
Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms-Explanatory Report, 123d Sess., para. 7, Doc. No. CM(2012)166–add (2012).
191 Id. art. 35.
192 Protocol No. 16 Amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Oct. 2, 2013, C.E.T.S. No. 2014, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_16_ENG.pdf.
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internalization of European rights really will stop “embarrassment” at
Strasbourg.
The strong version of the nationalist argument thus assumes that domestic
rights law provides an adequate substitute for the ECHR. This ends up
resembling the more pro-European story—that Convention rights should be
fully incorporated into national law. First, for domestic review to replace
international review, the national constitution or statute must be at least as
protective of fundamental rights as the ECHR.193 Moreover, the constitution
must not offer an approach to rights that differs significantly from the
approach that an ECtHR judge would take. Unless this assumption holds,
constitutional law does not provide a shield from the ECtHR; the losing party
will simply “appeal” to Strasbourg. Appeal will be unavailing only if values
and approaches already have to be internalized, or conversely, the nation’s
values and approaches must have heavily influenced European ones.194
Members of the UK Parliament were endorsing this view when emphasizing
the Britishness of the ECHR.195 The French Justice Minister also invoked
his country’s historical leadership in the development of human rights.196
The ECtHR explicitly allows states to differ in how they implement the
Convention under the margin of appreciation. Almost any case the court
hears for argument will tend to turn on whether the national government has
engaged in a rights violation by going below this floor, or whether it has
applied the rules within its margin of appreciation. In judging whether a
state has stepped outside the margin, the concept of European consensus
looms large. A challenge to practice that is within this consensus will likely
result in a case being rejected as manifestly ill-founded.197 The cases that get
argued are cases in which there is no consensus, or a state seeks to deviate
from the consensus. Staying within this consensus is likely to be the only
UK judges are legally bound to interpret the HRA in a manner “no less” expansive than
the ECtHR’s ECHR interpretation. Stephen Gardbaum, Reassessing the New Commonwealth
Model of Constitutionalism, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 167, 191 (2010).
194 See Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National
Legal Systems, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 677, 710.
195 See 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1227f, reprinted in BLACKBURN, supra note
72, at 377.
196
Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, 2me séance de mardi le
24 avril 1990, Débats Parlementaires, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Apr. 24, 1990, 593 (statement of Justice Minister Pierre
Arpaillange).
197 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Pavel Repyeuski, European Consensus and EU Accession to
the ECHR, in THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR 309, 312 (Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris &
Vassilis Tzevelekos eds., 2014).
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way to protect a state from Strasbourg review. Moreover, national courts are
not well placed to determine the scope of the margin of appreciation. So, a
case that turns on the margin of appreciation will typically mean a
Strasbourg appeal. That does not mean that the state may not ultimately win
its appeal. But if the aim is to avoid ECtHR oversight entirely, relying on the
margin of appreciation is risky.
The ECtHR frequently cited the House of Lords and now cites the UK
Supreme Court in order to understand UK law. It did so prior to the HRA.198
UK courts generally accept ECtHR jurisprudence and apply it in domestic
law.199 However, in select cases, the courts have refused to accept the
ECtHR’s interpretation at face value and have either issued a controversial
re-interpretation on the issue or, rarely, confronted Strasbourg.200 European
judges take seriously calls by the House of Lords and Supreme Court to
reconsider their judgments. For instance, judicial dialogue led Strasbourg to
alter its view of hearsay evidence, although the result was only a partial
victory for the UK Government.201 Cases remain in which the UK Supreme
Court and the ECtHR are at odds, such as with prisoner voting. The ECtHR
has now ruled several times that a blanket ban on prisoners’ voting is
unacceptable under Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the Convention, but the UK
courts have refused to find incompatibility with the HRA.202 Although
Westminster might prefer that Strasbourg actually listen, its own courts’
refusal to apply Strasbourg’s rule immediately is a signal that courts will, at
least in some instances, defend a British interpretation of Convention rights.
Although a parliamentary committee found inadequate implementation of
the ECHR and a “flood” of applications to Strasbourg,203 the number of cases
in which Strasbourg censured the United Kingdom went down in 2009 and

MASTERMAN, supra note 26, at 28.
Merris Amos, The Dialogue Between the United Kingdom Courts and the European
Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557, 564 (2012).
200 Id. at 565–68, 582; see also Victor Nealon v. Sec’y of State for Justice, [2015] EWHC
1565, [46] (admin) (finding the Strasbourg court’s decision regarding the applicability of
Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights to section 133 of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1988 unpersuasive and erroneous).
201 Delaney, supra note 90, at 586–89.
202 Amos, supra note 199, at 578–79.
203 LORDS & COMMONS JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ENHANCING PARLIAMENT’S ROLE
IN RELATION TO HUMAN RIGHT’S JUDGMENTS, 2010–15, H.C. 455, at 5, available at http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200910/jtselect/jtrights/85/85.pdf.
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2010, when the Supreme Court was established.204 This observation suggests
that the UK Supreme Court may be helping to bring UK case law in line with
European norms, and the UK Supreme Court’s explanations of the UK
approach may have encouraged Strasbourg judges to find that it fits within
the margin of appreciation. In many cases, the former approach seems to
have taken hold, with the UK courts implementing ECtHR case law to
expand the HRA. For instance, in Ullah, the UK Supreme Court was willing
to recognize much more extensive defenses to deportation on the basis of
ECtHR judgments.205 The UK Supreme Court also overturned the House of
Lords’ earlier ruling in Marper that retaining fingerprints and DNA profiles
was not a violation of Article 8 after the ECHR’s judgment finding a
violation in Marper.206 The Supreme Court ruled that the statute authorizing
police collection of data was unlawful. Instead of ordering destruction of all
of the collected data because the statute was unlawful, the Court allowed
Parliament a reasonable time to cure the deficiencies in the statute.207
On balance, the ECtHR appears to have devoted less attention to the
French Constitutional Council.208 That body’s syllogistic reasoning style
provides less material to respond to than do the UK Supreme Court’s
seriatim opinions, but Strasbourg judges reference the other French supreme
courts, the Court of Cassation and Council of State, much more often.209
Dialogue with the Council may be only a matter of time; French cases
decided in the past year show greater engagement with the Constitutional
Council’s reasoning.210 However, the Council’s own approach to European
law has barely changed.
204 Amos, supra note 199, at 581. The Supreme Court, COURTS AND TRIBUNAL JUDICIARY
(2015), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-justice-system/the-supreme-court/.
205 Id. at 580.
206 R (GC) v. Comm’r of the Police, [2011] UKSC 21, [15] (citing S. and Marper v. United
Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1169 (2008)).
207 Id. at 45–49.
208 The ECtHR did not review any cases from the French Constitutional Council in 2014.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 64 (2015), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2014_ENG.pdf.
209 In 2014, the ECtHR reviewed only two cases from France, one from the Council of State
and one from Court of Cassation.
210 See, e.g., Agnelet v. France, App. No. 61148/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33 (2013), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?/=001-115980 (reference to Constitutional Council’s decision on
a priority question); Segame SA v. France, App. No. 4837/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 38 (2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=002-3881 (discussing the Constitutional Council’s
ruling on a priority question); Depalle v. France, App. No. 34044/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 35-37
(2010) (reference to Constitutional Council in pre-2009 case).
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The French Constitutional Council’s approach to European case law is
markedly different from the UK Supreme Court’s. This difference arises not
only because of its very different style of giving judgments, but because the
Council has maintained since 1975 that it is a judge of the constitution, not of
treaties.211 This attitude did not change after the creation of the priority
constitutional question procedure. The Council’s priority question decisions
appear in a traditional format, and they are often spare, even in important
cases, with a singular focus on the law (in this case the constitution).212 This
format meshes with the understanding that law is legitimate if it is clear on
the face, which encourages a syllogistic style because it presents the
Council’s interpretation as flowing deductively from the law as written.
The Council draws from an eclectic mix of sources for rights law. The
operative clauses of the 1958 Constitution contain no rights, so the Council
instead references the 1798 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen
and the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, both of which are cited in the
1958 Constitution’s preamble. The Council also has recourse to “general
principles” of the French Constitution. In response to constitutional
questions, it will typically cite to the above documents and principles directly
as well as to its own prior case law or, more rarely, the Court of Cassation or
Council of State. Unlike the ECHR, which has no direct constitutional
standing, Article 88 of the French Constitution gives EU law a distinct place
in the constitutional order, and the Council has been called on to judge issues
such as the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty.213 In contrast, I have not
found an instance in which the Council cited either the ECHR, an ECtHR
judgment, or a French court’s judgment about an ECHR article.
Sources beyond the text of opinions suggest that the ECHR and ECtHR
jurisprudence both have influence. The Council is quite aware that its
syllogisms sometimes require further explanation, and publishes a “dossier”
of documents related to the case. In important cases, its Secretary General
will often publish an academic commentary. ECHR references are not
prominent in the dossiers. In one case, its decision stating that Parliament
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC, Jan. 15,
1975, Rec. 19 (Fr.).
212 Grewe, supra note 178, at 965.
213 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2007-560DC, Dec. 20,
2007, Rec. 459 (Fr.) (Lisbon Treaty accession). The Council even referred a question to the
CJEU. See Christine Maugue, La QPC: 5 Ans Déjà et Toujours Aucun Prescription en Vue,
79 LES NOUVEAUX CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 9, 15 (2015).
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could prohibit same-sex marriage, the Council cited to two ECtHR decisions
noting that states have a margin of appreciation in this area in the
accompanying dossier.214 A decision upholding a new law allowing samesex marriage included one ECtHR decision.215 It has also cited ECtHR
decisions in its review of security legislation in the wake of recent terror
attacks.216
However, even when the Council does not mention it, the ECHR seems to
have had an effect.217 Among the general principles of constitutional law are
several rights, such as a right to privacy in personal data and the right to
family life, which directly track ECHR rights not recognized elsewhere in
the constitutional corpus. For instance, the Council’s decision on the
retention of DNA information of all convicted offenders never mentioned the
ECtHR’s Marper judgment, but the Council’s holding that blanket retention
was unconstitutional was certainly in keeping with Strasbourg’s.218 At the
outset, professional commentary surrounding the Council embraced the idea
of convergence between the Council’s decisions and the ECtHR’s.219
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] decision No. 2010-92QPC, Dossier documentaire, http://
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/201092QPCdoc.
pdf (same-sex marriage prohibition).
215 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2013-669DC, Dossier
documentaire, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/down
load/2013669DCdoc.pdf (law allowing same-sex marriage).
216 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2015-719DC, Dossier
documentaire, http://www.conseil-consitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/downlo
ad/2015713DC2015713dc_doc.pdf (domestic intelligence gathering); 2015-527QPC, Dossier
documentaire, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cons eil-constitutionnel/root/bank/down
load/2015527QPC2015527qpc_doc.pdf (temporary house arrest permitted by emergency
legislation).
217 Constitutional scholar Denys de Bechillon noted this phenomenon.
See Denys de
Béchillon, Cinq Cours Suprêmes: Apologie (Mesurée) Du Désordre, 137 POUVOIRS 33, 36
(2011).
218 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010-25QPC, Sept. 16,
2010, Rec. 220 (retention of genetic data).
219 Most significantly the Council’s Secretary General, who directs legal staff that aid in
research for its decisions, embraced this view in a commentary in its official journal.
Guillaume, supra note 176, at 91. He cited the work of Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, an
influential member of the Council of State and proponent of the convergence thesis. Id. at 68,
78 (citing Dutheillet de Lamothe, supra note 8). Guillaume was at particular pains to describe
how the Council’s procedure would meet due process standards under Article 6 of the ECHR.
Id. at 70–83. The Council would thus apply the ECHR through its practice though it might
not refer to it in its legal interpretations, which were to remain limited to the constitution. Id.
at 67. See also Helène Surrel, Conseil constitutionnel et jurisprudence de la CEDH, 47 LES
NOUVEAUX CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 311 (2013) (discussing convergence
between French and ECHR rules related to the independence of tribunals).
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Moreover, the structure of the constitutional question means that
constitutional judging is not confined to the Constitutional Council. The
lower courts, the Council’s co-apex courts, and the Council of State and
Court of Cassation have substantial familiarity with the ECHR as well as
responsibility for framing and filtering constitutional questions. This
mandate makes convergence in legal orders likely to occur.220
In both France and the United Kingdom, reforms have mainly led to
courts seeking compatibility with the ECHR and the ECtHR’s interpretations
of it. These decisions forestall more censure on the international level,
preventing international “embarrassment” by weaving the ECHR and
Strasbourg’s approaches to it more tightly into domestic law. Importantly,
they require that lower courts now have to attend to domestic high courts and
domestic sources of law when judging rights.221
British conservatives, never entirely mollified by Labour’s promises of
avoiding Strasbourg, are not pleased and continue to contest the HRA’s
existence as well as the United Kingdom’s ties to the EU and Council of
Europe. The UK Supreme Court faces the same criticism as the ECtHR. In
France, however, the continued appeal of anti-Europe rhetoric, readily
apparent with the National Front party’s rise, is not mixed with anti-Council
rhetoric. The Council has taken a cautious approach, emphasizing the
Constitution to the exclusion of other sources of law. It has also repeatedly
emphasized Parliamentary power to set policy in controversial cases in
which there is a clear margin of appreciation. An example of such cases are
same-sex marriage and abortion in which the Council has refused to engage
arguments about equality and dignity.222 A priori review powers give it
continued importance to all parties in Parliament. Along with these
structural factors, the Council’s rights review powers may have simply not
been around long enough. In another decade, it may have its first major
confrontation with Parliament over rights or answer a constitutional question
in a way that places it firmly outside the margin of appreciation, both of
which might require more direct use of the ECHR.
Grewe, supra note 178, at 966.
See Maugue, supra note 213, at 15–16.
222 See, e.g., Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2013-669DC,
May 17, 2013, Rec. 721 (Fr.) (Parliament may decide whether to allow or prohibit same-sex
marriage); 2010-9 QPC, supra note 214; Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court]
decision No. 2014-700 DC, July 31, 2014 (Fr.) (Parliament has authority to remove
restrictions on abortion).
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The approach to rights jurisprudence created by the states parties is
pluralistic but favors the continued primacy of the ECHR.223 The CJEU and
ECtHR are unwilling to wait categorically, for the domestic courts. British
attempts at actual jurisdiction-stripping fizzled in Brighton, and memberstates were left instead with a new preliminary reference protocol that, once
enacted, could take more issues out of the apex courts and give them to the
ECtHR. The UK Supreme Court and the French Constitutional Council
have, for the most part, brought national law in line with Europe. The
difference in the Supreme Court’s open dialogue with the ECtHR and the
Council’s decision to cite only the constitution reflect differences in
prevailing norms for their own legal systems.
V. CONCLUSION
Individual petition under the ECHR brought the end of strong
parliamentary sovereignty across Europe. Under pressure from the ECtHR,
old democracies have chosen to adopt more robust forms of judicial review.
The political rhetoric supporting their adoption included some references to
embracing modern, human-rights oriented Europe, but also included a large
dose of legal protectionism. In the United Kingdom and France, parliaments
sometimes treated national judicial review as an alternative to international
review. This it may be, but only if subsidiarity works as it is supposed to and
national rights law largely matches the international court’s rules—a result
pro-Europeans would be at pains to disagree with. The system outlined here
resembles the pattern of overlapping jurisdictions and ultimate consensus one
might see in a federal court system.224 If constitutional meaning changes as
223 Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law, 71 MOD. L. REV.
183, 184 (2008).
224 See Rudolf Smend, Constitution and Constitutional Law, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE
OF CRISIS 240, 248 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., Belinda Cooper trans., 2000)
(“[C]onstitutional law is expected to ensure fulfillment of an ever-changing challenge that
must constantly be met in an optimal fashion. The factors in meeting this challenge shift as
time goes by and situations change.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism:
“Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1245–47 (1994). But the American
system’s preemption and abstention doctrines work very differently. Federal law is not
subsidiary to state law, but rather preempts it—and state supreme courts, final interpreters of
their state constitutions, receive no margin if interpreting the national constitution instead.
Although he mistakenly thinks that a federal system would create a stable one, de Béchillon
has argued that French scholars should throw out the idea of a hierarchy of norms and
embrace the tension between treaty and constitution because it better reflects actual practice.
See de Béchillon, supra note 217, at 36–37.
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the demands that people place on it change, the balance that federal
constitutions create between local and national readings may also change.225
It is out of the blurring of boundaries and of the origin of legal values that a
shared normative universe can emerge.
Meanwhile, the national courts’ place in the European legal order is likely
to change again. The EU’s Charter of Rights covers much the same content,
and the CJEU has held that EU law incorporates ECHR rights as general
principles. If accession to the ECHR cannot occur, and the CJEU’s
interpretations fail to track the ECHR either de jure or de facto, national
courts may end up moderating between them. The real challenge for the old
democracies may lie in the development of domestic jurisprudence that goes
beyond the European minimum, so that the ECHR, which has emboldened so
many courts in emerging democracies, does not become an excuse for
complacency in established ones.

Id. Commenters have often made this point regarding American federalism. See, e.g.,
Mauro Cappelletti & David Golay, Judicial Branch in the Federal and Transnational Union,
in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, BOOK 2:
POLITICAL ORGANS, INTEGRATION TECHNIQUES, AND JUDICIAL PROCESS 261, 306 (Mauro
Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler eds., 1986).
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